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Abstract 
After the October Revolution of 1917, the Bolsheviks restructured Russia’s legal system, assigning the central 
role in targeting their enemies to revolutionary tribunals. Within months, however, this ‘revolutionary justice’ 
was marginalized in favour of the secret police (Cheka) and a policy of terror. This article utilizes the archives 
of three tribunals, contemporary writings, newspapers and memoirs to examine the tribunals’ investigations and 
trials, and their impact. It argues that the relative failure of tribunals paved the way for the terror that engulfed 
Russia by autumn 1918 and laid the foundations of the repressive Soviet state. 
 
On 24 November 1917, as part of a radical overhaul of Russia’s legal system, the Bolsheviks 
established revolutionary tribunals to deal with counter-revolutionary threats, profiteering, 
speculation, sabotage and other ‘political’ crimes. The definition of counter-revolution was 
deliberately vague; it could be any thought or action attacking the goals and achievements of 
the revolution as defined by the Bolsheviks. Each tribunal had a chair, six members and an 
investigative commission selected by the local authorities. Penalties ranged from four years 
imprisonment with forced labour to fines or public censure. There was no right of appeal.
1
 At 
the Petrograd tribunal’s first meeting on 10 December, its chair, I. P. Zhukov, compared the 
new tribunals to those established during the French Revolution. Zhukov declared that the 
tribunal would be the ‘fiercest defender of the rights and customs of the Russian Revolution’ 
and that it would ‘strictly judge all those who act against the will of the people’.2 
The Bolsheviks believed that they had created a powerful weapon to secure their hold 
on power. They saw tribunals as part of a new legal system that would enact ‘revolutionary 
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justice’, creating an organized means of removing oppressive social relations, acting against 
threats to the revolution, and installing discipline into Russia. Other contemporaries saw 
something more threatening. The revolutionary tribunal in Paris, for example, enacted over 
2,700 death sentences between March 1793 and May 1795. Moral as well as material 
evidence had been sufficient to send many to the guillotine. It was not a court of law, but an 
‘an instrument of force dedicated to the furtherance of national and party politics’.3 Many of 
those who fled from the Bolsheviks portrayed the Russian version in similar terms. A former 
defence lawyer in the tribunals noted their unpredictable sentences, erratic procedures and 
manipulation of documentation. He compared the chief prosecutor, N. V. Krylenko, to his 
earlier French counterpart, A. Q. Fouquier-Tinville, and described how the steady 
marginalization of defence counsels led to increasingly ‘bloody results’.4 
Other evidence, however, paints a different picture. Zhukov admitted later that the 
‘bourgeoisie’ had expected something similar to Paris’s tribunal at the height of the terror, 
but argued that ‘hatred’ turned to ‘respect’ as Russian tribunals treated the accused 
objectively, did not deliver a single death sentence in the first six months, and actually freed 
many obvious enemies of the regime.
5
 Those involved in tribunals claimed that this reflected 
the ‘humane’ nature of the new ‘proletarian’ regime and its commitment to ‘revolutionary 
justice’. For other Bolsheviks, though, these sentences represented failure. On 30 March 
1918, for example, Lenin argued that the regime needed a ‘revolutionary court that is rapid 
and mercilessly severe in dealing with counter-revolutionaries, hooligans, idlers and 
disorganizers’.6 Others agreed, believing that the regime needed greater use of ‘revolutionary 
terror’ to combat its enemies. Tribunals were restructured in 1918 and permitted to impose 
the death penalty, but the number of executions remained low and there were wide-ranging 
amnesties. The initiative passed to the secret police (Cheka), who were increasingly ruthless 
in their treatment of enemies, despite the fact that they were supposed to leave the sentencing 
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of offenders to tribunals. When terror was sanctioned officially in September 1918 as the 
civil war intensified, it was not led by the tribunals, as in France in 1793–5, but by the Cheka. 
The regime had opted for revolutionary terror over revolutionary justice. 
This article uses archival records from three tribunals to examine the objectives, 
operation and effectiveness of tribunals in the crucial first year of Bolshevik power.
7
 
Tribunals were arbitrary and manipulated forums, and dispensed political judgements rather 
than justice, but those involved retained a belief that law and jurisprudence could play a role 
in the new Soviet state. Bolshevik legal theorists spilt much ink debating the nature of this 
role, and while they conceded that some degree of terror was necessary during the civil war, 
they argued for the continuation of legal processes and pressed for tribunals to remain the 
only body empowered to sentence offenders. 
The fact that tribunals became marginalized suggests that Bolshevik leaders felt that 
justice of any type was incompatible with an increasingly violent civil war. Those involved in 
tribunals were left fighting a futile battle to prevent them from becoming completely 
subservient to the ‘revolutionary terror’ practiced by the Cheka. They were not alone; there 
was sustained opposition to the Cheka from across the state apparatus. This indicated serious 
disagreements over the nature of the fledgling Soviet regime during these formative months, 
but terror prevailed and laid the foundations for future repression. 
 
 
 
Immediately after the revolution in October 1917, popular courts emerged spontaneously in 
working-class areas in major cities. These dispensed ‘proletarian’ and ‘revolutionary’ justice 
rather than the oppressive laws of the old regime. Judges were elected; legal training was 
irrelevant; there was public participation in the process, from prosecuting to sentencing; and 
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judgements were based on ‘revolutionary legality’.8 This usually equated to justice with a 
strong class character, lenient towards the lower social classes, and harsher on middle and 
upper classes. These courts, though, dealt with petty crimes. A commission was established 
under the Military Revolutionary Committee of the Soviet of Workers’, Soldiers’ and 
Peasants’ Deputies in Petrograd to target serious crimes, such as strikes and sabotage, which 
were designed to undermine the regime.
9
 The commission imprisoned some offenders on an 
ad hoc basis, but the government was dissatisfied. Discussing legal reform on 22 November, 
the Council of People’s Commissars (Sovnarkom) agreed that the absence of an official 
‘revolutionary court’ placed the state in a ‘desperate situation’, leaving it ‘powerless’ to deal 
with ‘counter-revolutionary’ crimes.10 
Consequently, two days later, the Bolsheviks published a decree formally abolishing 
the old justice system and establishing new people’s courts. The decree confirmed earlier 
innovations and placed the organization of justice under the control of soviets as the main 
local authority. Courts were to use old laws, but only where they had not been annulled by 
the Bolsheviks, or contradicted by new policies or revolutionary conceptions of justice.
11
 The 
decree urged all soviets to establish revolutionary tribunals to deal with counter-revolutionary 
crimes; ‘profiteering, speculation, sabotage, and other misdeeds’ affecting the state. The 
tribunal under Petrograd’s soviet was established on 3 December, Moscow followed on 5 
December, and many other towns had a tribunal by early 1918.
12
 But while the Commissariat 
of Justice issued the new decree and the regulations governing the operation of tribunals, the 
tribunals were established by, and responsible to, the local soviet. 
The potential for confusion quickly grew. On 5 December 1917, the commission of 
the Military Revolutionary Committee was disbanded only to re-emerge on 7 December as 
the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for the Struggle with Counter-Revolution and 
Sabotage (Cheka) under F. E. Dzerzhinskii. This revived the old political police. The Cheka 
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would conduct preliminary investigations into acts of counter-revolution and sabotage before 
transferring them to a tribunal for judgment. It would also be proactive, preventing counter-
revolution from occurring and targeting those planning to offend.
13
 Yet it was not controlled 
by tribunals, but answered directly to Sovnarkom. This was probably due to politics. The 
Bolsheviks were joined in government on 9 December by the Left Socialist Revolutionaries 
(S.R.s). They saw their participation as a means of moderating Bolshevik extremism and 
demanded to control the Commissariat of Justice. Fearing that this would restrict their room 
for manoeuvre, the Bolsheviks created the Cheka, which remained under their control as they 
retained a majority in Sovnarkom.
14
 
Therefore, tribunals were established by soviets, their procedures were decided by the 
Commissariat of Justice, while they had no control over their main investigative arm, which 
was responsible only to Sovnarkom. It was hardly surprising that interference from three 
different authorities led to confusion and tension over subsequent months, especially as 
conflict emerged immediately between the Left S.R. commissar of justice, I. Z. Shteinberg, 
and the Cheka. These problems were exacerbated by the government’s struggle to control 
provincial Russia where local soviets (due to fluctuating Bolshevik influence) pursued their 
own agendas, local commissars of justice failed to implement the orders of the commissariat, 
and newly-formed branches of the Cheka often proved uncontrollable. 
The waters were muddied further by the creation of a three-man press tribunal on 18 
December to target the ‘publication or circulation of any false or perverted reports and 
information about the events of public life’, thereby harming the interests of the revolutionary 
people. Sentences could range from fines, public censure or publishing a retraction, to the 
suppression of an organ and the confiscation of its printing press. The trial of a publication 
did not prevent the individuals involved from facing an ordinary tribunal.
15
 Lenin was 
convinced that the press was the main weapon of the bourgeoisie and that the freedom of the 
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press simply gave the bourgeoisie freedom to mislead people.
16
 The Decree on Press issued 
on 26 October had reintroduced censorship, but newspapers could rarely be silenced for long, 
usually reopening under a new name, and officials felt that the number of hostile newspapers 
was actually increasing during this period.
17
 This tribunal would be a new weapon, but the 
blurred boundaries between it and other tribunals were ripe for further confusion. 
The following day, 19 December, saw a new decree with more detailed instructions 
for all tribunals.
18
 Several points are worth noting. First, the decree confirmed that tribunals 
would act against those organizing uprisings or other resistance; those using their official 
posts to undermine the state; economic saboteurs; and anyone violating government orders. 
While still vague, these instructions encouraged tribunals to look beyond obvious political 
and social enemies. The latter were likely to organize revolts or open sabotage, but failures in 
production, not fulfilling orders or the misuse of authority were crimes likely to be committed 
by all types of individuals. Second, the decree reaffirmed the range of sentences, from fines 
and public censure to imprisonment and exile. Execution was not permitted. The Bolsheviks 
were keen to promote an image of moderation given that the abolition of the death penalty 
had been a key popular demand during 1917. Third, information (or denunciations) provided 
by any individual or institution could form the basis of an inquiry, and the decision on 
whether to proceed to a trial had to be made within forty-eight hours of receiving the 
complaint. Fourth, trials should be public, while defendants were entitled to a defence and 
would be assigned one if they did not provide their own. Finally, there was no right of appeal. 
The commissar of justice could request a retrial if there were procedural violations or an 
obvious injustice. Shteinberg did establish a section at the commissariat on 25 January to 
examine complaints, but this was closed on 2 April after his departure a few weeks earlier.
19
 
The public nature of trials reflected another role of tribunals – they were to educate as 
well as judge. Trials would draw blunt and understandable lessons about the guilt of certain 
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individuals, concepts and activities. By reporting trials in newspapers, and later by restaging 
them as theatrical performances across Russia with actors playing the parts of prosecutors 
and defendants, the regime reinforced the messages that it wanted to convey.
20
 Trials would 
instruct viewers on the values and objectives of the new regime, and on the need for vigilance 
against enemies. By involving the audience in trials as prosecutors, witnesses and observers, 
tribunals appeared to dispense justice based on the people’s will. This reinforced the 
legitimacy of the Bolshevik regime as it enacted popular demands. Moreover, the trials would 
project this legitimacy and the unique values of the regime across the world through the 
observations of foreign journalists. 
One historian described the new legal system as ‘legalized lawlessness’; there were 
courts, but no laws beyond revolutionary consciousness, while people were punished for 
undefined crimes.
21
 This is partly true, but it underestimates the importance that all Russians 
placed on establishing revolutionary justice. The old legal system was seen as upholding the 
power of the ‘bourgeoisie’, and its control over wealth and property, so it was logical that a 
new system would reinforce the ‘proletarian’ state and emphasize popular conceptions of 
justice. Bolshevik legal theorists agreed; law was not an impartial force, but ‘the system or 
order of social relations corresponding to the interests of the ruling class and protected by the 
organized force of that class’.22 To quote P. I. Stuchka, commissar of justice from March to 
September 1918, ‘societies are not founded on laws; laws are founded on societies’.23 
Revolutionary justice would provide a structured means of eliminating oppressive elements 
from the past, defending revolutionary achievements and promoting order. On 9 November 
1918, D. I. Kurskii, commissar of justice from September 1918, emphasized that 
revolutionary justice was a way to forge discipline and order in the new state.
24
 
Tribunals promised to be an important means of defending the regime and reshaping 
society. However, an examination of their investigations and trials reveals how their multiple 
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objectives – legal, political and educational – often clashed, as did the different authorities 
involved. Equally, their objectives altered in line with the changing needs of the state during 
this turbulent time. Tribunals had to secure the stability of the regime, which equated to 
ensuring Bolshevik control over the political landscape during a period when increasingly 
diverse activities were being classed as politically threatening. 
 
 
The files of the Petrograd tribunal and its investigative commission, along with those from 
the press tribunal and the supreme tribunal established in Moscow in 1918, demonstrate that 
all types of individuals were investigated, and that a range of activities were classified as 
‘counter-revolutionary’ and harmful to the new state. In the first months after October, most 
investigations revolved around two themes, revolt and sabotage, and involved individuals 
who were obvious political opponents. By mid 1918, a wider range of crimes were being 
investigated, encompassing an equally diverse range of individuals. 
The fear of revolt stemmed from the events of the October Revolution. The 
Bolsheviks’ seizure of power in Petrograd was resisted by groups of Junkers and officers who 
seized the telephone exchange and other strategic points, hoping to link up with forces 
mustered by the previous government. The revolt did not last a day, but outbreaks of vicious 
fighting claimed around 200 lives. Initiated by the Military Revolutionary Committee’s 
investigative commission, the Petrograd tribunal’s first cases involved officers accused of 
participating in the revolt, while fears of further revolts persisted. 
Furthermore, as the Bolsheviks tried to establish control over ministries and other 
crucial institutions (such as banks), they met with passive resistance (seen as sabotage) from 
civil servants, usually in the form of strikes, which persisted for several months. Similarly, as 
they struggled to control rising economic chaos across the country, they tried to clamp down 
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on ‘economic saboteurs’ – speculators or swindlers who undermined their policies. Dozens of 
cases of ‘sabotage’ were investigated. Many files lack detail beyond the broad accusation, 
which often boiled down to a simple dereliction of duties or petty theft, but some involved 
active agitation for political alternatives and damage to factory machinery.
25
 In many cases, 
the charge was simply ‘not recognizing Soviet power’, but this was considered dangerous to a 
regime concerned with asserting its authority.
26
 
Concerns about revolt and sabotage underpinned the first three major trials conducted 
by Petrograd’s tribunal, but the individuals selected represented a broader range of enemies. 
On 10 December 1917, Countess S. V. Panina, deputy minister of education prior to October 
and a leading member of the liberal Kadet party, was the first to be tried. Panina admitted to 
withholding 93,000 rubles from the Bolsheviks when they took over the ministry in 
November. She stated that it was only accessible to the legal authority, the nationally-elected 
Constituent Assembly. The tribunal charged her with criminal sabotage.
27
 Yet, from the 
numerous cases of sabotage, why was Panina selected for the first trial? Soviet historians 
emphasized that the sums of money involved were desperately needed given the resistance 
from banks. They also highlight her involvement in political opposition to the Bolsheviks.
28
 
The Bolsheviks did need money. Princess Dolgorukova, Panina’s cousin, claimed that the 
Bolsheviks hoped to raise more money by obtaining bail or by allowing her to ‘escape’, 
permitting them to confiscate her property.
29
 The Bolsheviks offered bail for 180,000 rubles, 
twice as much as the missing sum.
30
 Recent studies stress the political element.
31
 Her arrest 
came on the day that her party was banned and the Constituent Assembly was due to sit 
before being postponed. Panina herself added a class dimension, later claiming that she had 
committed three sins; she was an aristocrat, rich and a Kadet.
32
 Coming soon after the 
abolition of social classes, her noble background was seen as an additional crime. Unlike 
10 
 
others accused of sabotage, Panina represented several of the regime’s political and social 
enemies, and seemed an obvious choice for the first, high-profile trial. 
Similar observations can be made about the subject of the second trial, General V. G. 
Boldyrev. The Junkers’ revolt in Petrograd reinforced Bolshevik suspicions of officers as a 
reactionary group and they assumed, with some justification, that officers would form the 
backbone of any resistance. On 9 November, the Bolshevik’s new commander-in-chief, 
Krylenko, who held this post prior to his involvement in tribunals, departed for military 
headquarters to assert his authority. He met with indifference from most senior commanders. 
On 11 November, he arrived at Pskov and asked to see the commander of the Northern Front, 
General A. V. Cheremisov, to discuss his ‘socio-political views’. Cheremisov refused. He 
later claimed illness, but Krylenko believed him to be perfectly healthy and an ‘intriguer’, 
and he was arrested and transferred to a Petrograd prison.
33
 Krylenko met with a similar 
response in Dvinsk on 12 November, where the local commander, Boldyrev, also refused to 
co-operate and was arrested.
34
 As Cheremisov had at least expressed his discontent with the 
previous government by refusing to follow orders to suppress the October Revolution a 
fortnight earlier, Boldyrev was considered a better choice to place on trial for his refusal to 
recognize Soviet power and to send out a message to other officers. 
The third major trial in late 1917 was the first to involve a group. V. M. Purishkevich, 
a noble and outspoken monarchist, and participant in Rasputin’s murder in December 1916, 
was accused of forming an organization to launch an armed counter-revolution against the 
Bolsheviks, as well as financing arms used in the Junkers’ revolt. He had written to the 
Cossack general, A. M. Kaledin, promising to raise armed detachments to fight the 
Bolsheviks when Kaledin arrived, as Purishkevich believed that he would. Another thirteen 
individuals were charged with various crimes, from joining Purishkevich’s organization and 
purchasing arms, to participating in the revolt.
35
 The regime publicized this plot widely. On 7 
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November, the Bolshevik newspaper, Pravda, published the letter to Kaledin. It stressed that 
Purishkevich was an unrepentant monarchist and that the Bolsheviks had foiled a counter-
revolutionary officers’ plot. Inaccurately, the article linked the affair to Prince F. F. Iusupov, 
a member of one of Russia’s richest aristocratic families and another participant in Rasputin’s 
murder.
36
 The following day, another report was published alongside a cartoon that simplified 
the affair. Several prosperous, bourgeois figures, including Purishkevich, sat around the table 
in an imitation of the last supper, toasting a portrait of the former tsar, Nicholas II.
37
 The 
cartoon included a priest, purely (like the Iusupov reference) to reinforce the image of former 
elites plotting a return to the old regime. 
Tribunals took the threat from monarchists seriously, despite their lack of popular 
support and the disintegration of their organizations in 1917.
38
 Officers’ unions were also 
investigated as these were assumed to be monarchist or anti-Bolshevik. Most were inactive, 
but several were closed.
39
 The Bolsheviks also closed surviving conservative newspapers. 
Purishkevich’s daily newspaper, Narodnyi tribun, which he had launched in September 1917, 
was closed down on 26–27 October. Its articles had been openly anti-Bolshevik. 
Purishkevich’s brother, who served as the editor, managed to publish an issue using a 
different printing press on 29 October before he was arrested. Another conservative paper, 
Malen’kaia gazeta, had been closed repeatedly in 1917 only to reopen as Rus, Novaia rus 
and, after October, Piter. Its leader on 17 December asked bluntly, ‘when will the Bolsheviks 
leave?’, while every edition attacked the new decrees and the deteriorating economy.40 
Closing the paper again was considered insufficient, so its editors were arrested and tried by 
the tribunal.
41
 
Another area of concern was the reliability of those who served the Bolsheviks. 
Tribunals reacted suspiciously to anything in an individual’s past that he or she had tried to 
conceal since October. Cornet N. I. Pokrovskii, for example, was placed in charge of the 
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Winter Palace after the October Revolution, but was accused of stealing from its collections. 
The subsequent investigation discovered that he was a former member of the Military 
League, a conservative military-civilian body that emerged in March 1917 to press for law 
and order in Russia. Accusations of spying for the tsarist secret police (Okhrana) also 
surfaced. Eventually, Pokrovskii was judged to have joined the league when it was ‘fully 
legal’, and the other evidence was considered unreliable, mainly because his accusers were 
also charged with being Okhrana provocateurs.
42
 
Former links to the Okhrana were particularly damning. V. I. Krivosh had volunteered 
to work for the Bolsheviks. His knowledge of languages and ability to decipher cryptograms 
led to work in the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. However, unfavourable rumours about 
his past and his character prompted an investigation, and he was arrested on 25 January 1918 
on the evidence of a former official in the Okhrana. He was accused of passing information 
about Russian émigrés to the Okhrana during his previous job as a censor and translator for 
the tsarist government. He was also accused of spying for the Germans during the First World 
War. The Bolsheviks viewed his attempt to conceal his past particularly unfavourably, 
believing that he had intended to discredit the regime deliberately. This can hardly have been 
an unusual case given the Bolsheviks’ desperate need for skilled personnel, but a large 
amount of effort was devoted to investigating these claims. This also revealed that Krivosh 
was a class enemy, a noble, who had been born in Austria-Hungary (no doubt fuelling the 
accusations of spying), and his subsequent career was examined in minute detail. Files were 
unearthed from the Okhrana, while a large amount of money was discovered in his flat.
43
 He 
was found guilty on 14 March 1918 and sentenced to a year in prison.
44
 
Despite these assiduous investigations, many of the accusations remain unconvincing. 
Most lack the seriousness that the regime ascribed to them, being little more than inefficient 
work (not sabotage) or lack of support (rather than counter-revolutionary activities). The 
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most dubious are the regime’s determined attempts to establish the existence of organized 
plots based on tenuous links between defendants. This may have been done to reinforce the 
case against the accused, but it was also an early sign of suspicions that resistance could not 
be isolated, which were to have devastating consequences in later years. 
A typical example was Count N. K. fon Mekk, president of the board of the Moscow-
Kazan railroad. On 1 June 1918, the Cheka searched his apartment in Moscow, removed 
books and papers, and arrested him. Beyond a general suspicion of nobles and industrialists, 
the arrests were prompted by a conviction that Mekk was providing money and supplies to 
the anti-Bolshevik movement in south Russia. In addition, his name had been used by a 
society of property owners and builders; he was accused of being a member of a council of 
importers in Moscow; and he possessed a brochure for a charitable military society, which 
promised to help wounded officers and their families. All of this was regarded suspiciously. 
Mekk denied links to the south, claimed not to have heard of any of the named societies, and 
had been given the brochure. The accusations were eventually dropped.
45
 Further suspicion, 
though, was aroused by Mekk’s links to a missionary society, which the regime believed to 
be a front for a counter-revolutionary religious group headed by the notorious monarchist and 
priest, I. I. Vostorgov. The evidence against Mekk was again too weak, but another priest, D. 
A. Korneev, struggled to prove that a past acquaintance with Vostorgov was only a 
professional collaboration to edit a religious journal.
46
 
These individuals may have been guilty of the accusations, but the connections drawn 
by the regime seem tenuous and other cases support this view. The prime minister from 
February to July 1917, Prince G. E. L’vov, was arrested in Tiumen on 12 March 1918 after a 
‘plot’ was uncovered thousands of miles away in Moscow among people unknown to him, 
which proposed him as a figurehead. He denied any knowledge and was later released, but 
not until an extensive investigation into his activities and acquaintances had finished.
47
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An examination of the case against Purishkevich also reveals inconsistencies. The 
defendants’ testimonies indicate that while some were close acquaintances, others claimed 
(convincingly) to have barely met Purishkevich and have nothing to do with an organization. 
Indeed, the very existence of a formal organization is doubtful. A group of monarchists did 
meet to discuss politics, but the meetings took place before October and simply involved 
‘conversations’ about a monarchy in Russia.48 Two testimonies described Purishkevich as 
being in charge of an organized body, but they did not provide concrete details.
49
 They were 
probably referring to previous groups that he had founded, which seem to have been inactive 
by this stage. Furthermore, one defendant later claimed that the trial included a thief, a 
mentally unstable Bolshevik provocateur and an anti-Bolshevik socialist. None was 
connected to the rest, but they were added to discredit the monarchists further.
50
 The fact that 
the defendants were accused of different crimes – Purishkevich, for example, was not 
charged with participating in the Junkers’ revolt, while others were accused of taking part in 
the revolt, but not Purishkevich’s organization – reinforces the sense that investigators forged 
a counter-revolutionary plot from a disorganized group of disgruntled monarchists. 
Weak evidence or unsubstantiated accusations were common. Count A. A. Olsuf’ev 
was accused in early 1918 of belonging to a partisan group organizing an armed uprising 
against Soviet power. No evidence was included in the case files, but apparently an unnamed 
witness existed.
51
 The same unsubstantiated accusations were levelled against Colonel A. D. 
Khomutov at this time, although there is no reference to the cases being connected.
52
 The 
reliance on denunciations led to cases based solely on petty disagreements or general social 
conflict rather than specific crimes. On 22 November 1917, seventeen officers from a Finnish 
regiment in Mogilev were accused of ‘counter-revolutionary activities’ and arrested by the 
soldiers’ soviet. The vague accusations were never explained and, one-by-one, investigators 
found ‘no basis or evidence’ to support them. The final officer was released on 20 March 
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1918, but none was permitted to return to his original post, demonstrating the lengthy and 
destructive process of the tribunals, even for those found innocent.
53
 
These investigations demonstrated that the regime feared traditional political and 
social enemies above all else. They expected opposition and tended to see it in anything from 
outright revolt to not fulfilling duties at work. Cases were driven by suspicions, accusations 
were vague, and evidence insubstantial or selectively utilized. In 1918, however, the 
definition of counter-revolution (or a political crime) expanded to include anything that could 
be interpreted as opposing or undermining the regime. In late 1917, Lenin wrote that the 
Bolsheviks did not just have political enemies, but enemies in ‘everyday economic life’, and 
that idlers, shirkers and rogues constituted as great a threat to the revolution as the 
bourgeoisie.
54
 Newspapers reported increasing numbers of cases involving lower social 
groups. Their crimes ranged from conducting unauthorized searches to illicit brewing, both 
sabotage through ill-discipline.
55
 Christie Story argued that more workers and trade union 
members were being targeted by 1919, as were other socialists (particularly S.R. party 
members), as popular disillusionment with the Bolsheviks grew.
56
 
Moreover, a renewed attack on the press (especially socialist newspapers) in the first 
half of 1918 demonstrated that the Bolsheviks took words as seriously as actions. As noted 
above, a press tribunal had been created on 18 December, but there was confusion over its 
jurisdiction. After receiving confirmation from Sovnarkom of its sole right to sentence 
offending publications, the first public trials conducted by the tribunal started on the same 
day, 28 January, as a new decree reiterated its remit.
57
 The Bolshevik press carried endless 
reports on these cases. Initially, most papers were fined, censured or temporarily closed, but 
measures quickly became harsher. Newspapers were permanently closed and their editors 
tried by ordinary tribunals and imprisoned.
58
 In essence, the regime instructed tribunals to 
ensure that papers were closed down by any means.
59
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An even more damning interpretation of the threat posed by written criticism emerged 
in April 1918. On 31 March, Iu. O. Martov, a Menshevik leader, condemned the recent peace 
treaty with the Germans in the party’s Moscow newspaper, Vpered. Discussing the impact of 
the treaty on Russia’s position in the Caucasus, Martov mentioned that I. V. Stalin, 
commissar of nationalities, had been expelled from the region’s social democratic party in 
1908 for organizing bank robberies. Stalin was outraged and accused Martov of libel. The 
case was heard in public trials on 5 April and 16 April and started a month-long debate that 
resulted in a much harder line towards written criticism.
60
 
Both trials were dominated by arguments over whether this case was suitable for a 
tribunal. Martov and his lawyers argued that it should be heard in a district people’s court as 
it was a private dispute involving two individuals. Quoting from the decree on tribunals, they 
stated that tribunals were for cases of special importance that touched on the ‘interests of all 
the people’. This was not such a case unless Stalin represented ‘all of the people’. Stalin and 
his team argued that the case did have special significance as it involved leading political 
figures. Moreover, its allegations implicated other Bolsheviks, now commissars, and were 
intended to undermine the entire government. As Martov realized, the concept that criticizing 
an individual equated to a crime against the state had threatening implications. Initially, the 
tribunal ruled in Martov’s favour, declaring that accusations against individuals did not come 
under its jurisdiction. But it then picked up on Stalin’s argument that these accusations were 
part of broader criticism of the government and proposed to judge Martov on these charges. 
Martov was furious; his criticisms reflected his different political beliefs and he was prepared 
to defend these in court. In this case, his lawyer added, all the Bolsheviks insulted should be 
present. Unsurprisingly, this attempt to pit Menshevism against Bolshevism in court failed as 
the tribunal rejected his protests. 
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This trial pre-empted a sustained assault on Vpered. Its attacks on the Brest-Litovsk 
peace treaty and criticism of the growing level of violence prompted the trial of its editors on 
20 April, who included senior Mensheviks. Despite gathering evidence to support their 
claims, this was disregarded, as were arguments that the Mensheviks supported Soviet rule, 
just not Bolshevik authoritarianism. The trial did not produce a verdict and the paper 
continued until early May, but the chair of the tribunal ruled that ‘one may prepare an 
uprising by stockpiling arms or by preparing minds’; therefore, libel directed towards the 
government was tantamount to an uprising.
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The message from all of these cases was clear by mid 1918. The Bolsheviks were 
seeking to use tribunals to establish their control over Russia’s political landscape. Thus, 
tribunals were extending their activities by broadening their definitions of what constituted a 
crime, enabling them to assess and judge people’s actions across a range of activities. 
Nevertheless, a question mark remained over the effectiveness of tribunals as a weapon to 
eradicate these offences. 
 
 
 
Tribunals were instructed to take transcripts of the trials, but rarely did, leaving newspaper 
reports and memoirs as the only means by which to reconstruct them. This probably reflects 
the shortage in manpower across the state apparatus during this period. Stenographers, in 
particular, were scarce and expensive to employ.
62
 It may also represent the fact that some 
investigations never made it to a trial. Some collapsed through lack of evidence, while a later 
amnesty, discussed below, led to some cases being closed. An early financial resolution was 
also not unusual. Mekk’s arrest, described above, prompted a general meeting of workers at 
his railway company on 3 June 1918. Around 400 signed a petition demanding his release, 
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while fellow directors and the political commissar to the railroad also appealed. All argued 
that Mekk, with thirty-five years of experience in the company, was essential to its operation, 
which was crucial given the supply crisis engulfing the country. He was released on 16 July, 
but only after 150,000 rubles had been paid. He was rearrested several times until the state 
recognized his expertise and offered him a job in 1920.
63
 Prince D. N. Shakhovskoi, a banker 
accused of organizing a counter-revolutionary plot, was offered release for a million rubles. 
There is no evidence on whether this offer was accepted or on his fate.
64
 
 Otherwise, the absence of transcripts may reflect evidence that suggests that the 
Bolsheviks saw many of the trials as unsuccessful. A trial was an important purpose of the 
tribunal; as A. V. Galkin, one of the first Bolshevik judges, noted, the Bolsheviks needed to 
‘unmask their active enemies before the workers and punish them publicly’.65 However, 
tribunals operated during an uncertain period; the Bolsheviks were not sure which enemies 
posed the greatest threat, while the old legal system had been abolished, but its replacement 
was incomplete. Consequently, the Bolsheviks were uncertain about how to organize trials or 
how severely to punish the guilty. 
 Undoubtedly, the regime felt that if it controlled those involved in tribunals, it would 
ensure a favourable outcome. In 1918, ninety per cent of the fifty chairmen and members 
surveyed across twenty-nine tribunals were party members. Around forty-two per cent were 
workers, with sixty per cent having lower levels of education, twenty-six per cent middling 
levels and fourteen per cent higher education.
66
 By 1922, 263 out of 265 tribunal personnel 
surveyed (over ninety-nine per cent) were party members. A survey of another 100 members 
noted that fifty per cent were workers, nineteen per cent civil servants, ten per cent peasants 
and only two per cent had previous legal experience. In addition, eighty-three per cent had 
lower levels of education, ten per cent middling levels and only four per cent had higher 
education. This contrasted with people’s courts where twenty-nine per cent were party 
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members, eighteen per cent had higher education, forty-four per cent were civil servants and 
twenty-two per cent had a legal background.
67
 The 1922 figures were disputed, with 
alternative statistics suggesting that all tribunal members belonged to the party and that 
greater numbers had higher (six per cent) and middling (seventeen per cent) levels of 
education, as well as backgrounds in the legal profession (eight per cent).
68
 The 
predominance of party members, however, remains clear, as does their lack of legal training. 
Yet the regime was unable to rely on these individuals to share their conception of 
‘revolutionary justice’. Lacking education and legal training, tribunal members reacted in 
different ways, especially as the regime provided little guidance. Zhukov, the first chairman 
of the Petrograd tribunal, was twenty-eight years old in 1917. Born into a peasant family, he 
had three years of rural schooling, one and a half years of evening courses, and a year at a 
people’s university. He had become a joiner after 1905 and a party member in 1909. He was 
arrested in 1912 for organizing a strike, was an active agitator during the First World War 
and served in the Petrograd soviet in 1917.
69
 As he admitted later, he had no legal experience. 
He received no instructions and felt that there was a lack of legal procedure to guide him. He 
relied on his ‘revolutionary consciousness’, but conceded that only experience enabled him to 
adapt to the conditions.
70
 Colonel F. V. Vinberg, a defendant in Purishkevich’s case, who 
despised the tribunal and the Bolsheviks, felt that Zhukov tried to be conscientious, orderly 
and impartial in his unusual job, but struggled to control aggressive prosecutors.
71
 Obtaining 
reliable personnel was worse in provincial Russia where Bolshevik control was weaker. A 
conference of local commissars of justice in late April 1918 saw several complaints about the 
quality of tribunal personnel, particularly at district level.
72
 
 The evidence also suggests that tribunals often struggled to find sufficient staff. In 
Odessa, everyone with legal education in the local soviet was mobilized in early December 
1917 to bring some level of knowledge to the tribunal. However, two resigned, protesting at 
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forming laws prior to the Constituent Assembly, while the Ukrainian authorities felt that 
tribunals were unnecessary. By mid December, still facing a manpower shortage, the city 
authorities agreed that the situation was calm, there was no need for a tribunal and its cases 
were transferred to people’s courts.73 This was unusual and reflected the Bolsheviks’ lack of 
authority in this region, but other tribunals also failed to find the requisite number of judges. 
The authorities tried to establish a permanent pool of qualified individuals to draw upon, but 
the problem persisted.
74
 Zhukov recalled several people working from early morning to late 
at night processing, investigating and judging increasing amounts of cases.
75
 
All Bolshevik institutions were understaffed and overworked, but this, along with a 
casual regard for previous legal practices, must have contributed to the disorganized nature of 
proceedings. Defendants complained that they had no idea why they had been arrested, 
sometimes finding out from newspapers. The availability of newspapers reflected a leniency 
towards prisoners that extended, in the Purishkevich case at least, to allowing the defendants 
to mingle together in prison and even to share the same cell. It must have been easy for them 
to formulate a common line of defence.
76
 Officials often left documents unsigned and used 
copies not originals, sometimes handwritten and illegible. 
This disorganization extended to the trial. Most available accounts describe trials held 
in Petrograd in the former palace of the tsar’s uncle, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich. 
According to one foreign observer, ‘the ducal music room’ was selected for the trials, which 
was ‘spacious and with walls panelled in rare woods’.77 No doubt this created an impression 
of formality alongside a symbolic message that the new regime had taken over the private 
spaces of former elites. It was also, as another noted, similar to ‘a modern stage set’,78 
enhancing its value as an instructive forum. All accounts agree that the early trials were 
packed with spectators, but that ordinary Russians were outnumbered by ‘well-dressed’ men 
and women, mainly supporters of the defendants.
79
 Galkin wrote that it was difficult to 
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mobilize workers for tribunal work; soldiers and party activists conducted investigations and 
organized trials.
80
 This is hardly surprising; working people had little time to attend trials. But 
contemporaries did fear that there was a worrying lack of interest from the very people these 
trials were intended to instruct, and who were supposed to participate as prosecutors and 
witnesses. It also created a hostile and unpredictable atmosphere in the court that intimidated 
inexperienced judges and undermined their control of proceedings. 
These problems became clear at Panina’s trial on 10 December 1917. After outlining 
the evidence, Zhukov asked for a voice for the prosecution from the crowd. Clearly no-one 
had been assigned this role and unexpectedly no-one volunteered. Zhukov was forced to turn 
to the defence. Panina had nominated the director of an educational institute that she funded 
to speak on her behalf. He questioned whether she had ‘stolen’ the money since she was 
happy to make it available to an elected government, while her funding of popular education 
and extensive charitable work made her an unlikely enemy of the people. The court, in his 
view, could only convict her for her politics, which it had promised not to do. Her second 
nominated witness was refused the floor. Instead, a worker spoke, supposedly spontaneously. 
He too supported Panina. He reiterated her history of charitable work and claimed that it was 
through her educational institution that he became literate. The court, he argued, should 
demonstrate to the watching world that the Russian people value their friends. After this, 
Zhukov did manage to find a worker to speak out against Panina, but only on the basis of her 
social class. This worker urged the court not to see her as an individual, but as a 
representative of a class and a party actively opposing the popular authorities; the ‘ideals of 
the working classes’ were ‘under threat’ and the court must act. An official from the 
Commissariat of Education then stressed that the money was needed urgently to pay the 
wages of ordinary employees. Finally, Panina was permitted to have the final word. She re-
emphasized that she would release the funds to an elected government.
81
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In short, the trial failed to go to plan. Panina and her supporters had plenty of time to 
outline their defence, and enjoyed a huge amount of support in the form of spontaneous 
cheers and disturbances as further supportive speeches were prohibited. She represented 
several enemies for the regime, but her guilt was less clear-cut for observers. Revolutionary 
‘justice’ required taking into account her class and political views, but her long history of 
charitable and educational work became more important. In focusing on her politics, her 
accusers miscalculated as she was better known for her social work. Nonetheless, reports 
described an anxious atmosphere as people awaited the verdict. Some anticipated the 
guillotine.
82
 In the end, the court censured her publicly and resolved that she should remain in 
prison until the money had been repaid. Many spectators had expected much worse. 
 Similar scenes characterized Boldyrev’s trial on 14 December. Boldyrev argued that 
he had acted in agreement with the local army committee in refusing to accede to the 
demands of the Bolsheviks. The committee had not wanted to submit to a single party 
government, while he feared that moving troops to fight the Bolsheviks’ political enemies 
would leave the front open to the Germans. The committee reversed its decision, but 
Boldyrev claimed not to have known. However, he admitted that even if the committee had 
supported the Bolsheviks initially, he recognized only the Constituent Assembly. A soldier 
from the committee testified on Boldyrev’s modest background, his rise on the basis of his 
military skills, and that he shared the soldiers’ hardships and led them into battle, but 
Boldyrev was still condemned to three years in prison. No-one was satisfied. For those who 
demanded a stiff sentence for an officer disobeying the Bolsheviks, this was too lenient, but it 
was too harsh for his supporters. Accounts vary, but all agree that there was chaos in the 
courtroom. Zhukov threatened to disperse the crowd, cleared the courtroom or even arrested 
up to twenty people, restoring order at gunpoint, depending on which account is believed.
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 The trial of Purishkevich and those linked to him opened on 28 December.
84
 
Prosecutors were appointed, rather than relying on spontaneous accusations from the crowd. 
Zhukov agreed that Purishkevich could call on soldiers as witnesses to his charitable work 
during the war, but backed down in the face of prosecutors’ protests. Zhukov also permitted 
the prosecution to start and conclude the trial, rather than allowing the defence the final word 
as before. He did curtail another summary by the second prosecutor, but only after 
Purishkevich’s lawyer protested. Lacking evidence, the prosecutors focused on the 
defendants’ backgrounds. One was accused of deserting the military after the October 
Revolution and questioned about the punishments inflicted on soldiers by officers in the pre-
revolutionary army. Another was interrogated about his membership of monarchist unions 
before 1917. The focus on the defendants’ monarchist views was repeated across the trial, 
representing a concerted effort to demonstrate that what the defendants represented was as 
important as what they had done. As one judge noted, the ‘new world judges the old world’.85 
Nevertheless, the trial remained unpredictable. Several of the defendants flatly denied 
the testimonies that they had previously provided to the tribunal’s investigators. Prosecutors 
and newspaper reports admitted that the key witness, Ensign E. V. Zelinskii, whose capture 
and confession underpinned the case, was nervous and mentally unstable, and tried to escape 
at one stage.
86
 Defence lawyers accused Zelinskii of being a Bolshevik agent. He collapsed in 
hysterics and revoked his testimony. Claiming that he was mentally unstable, the lawyers 
called in experts to examine him.
87
 Purishkevich gave a three-hour speech denying that a plot 
existed, while defending his political views. He accused the Bolsheviks of attacking the rights 
and freedoms achieved by the revolution, providing only hunger and political terror in return. 
The tribunal was nothing more than a political court and Russia’s legal authority was the 
Constituent Assembly.
88
 Other defendants were also permitted time to emphasize positive 
elements from their past, deny the allegations and attack the Bolsheviks.
89
 Purishkevich 
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received the maximum four years imprisonment with forced labour. Vinberg and two others 
received three years. All could seek release after a year, conditional on good behaviour. The 
other defendants received lesser sentences and two were freed due to their youth.
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 These early trials are among the best documented, partly because the Bolsheviks were 
more circumspect about which cases they subjected to a public trial after these experiences. 
Three aspects stand out. First, there were issues over the charges levelled at the defendants. 
Early trials revolved around the non-recognition of Soviet power. The first trial held in 
Moscow on 22 December 1917 was of a senior city official who was accused of not 
recognizing the authority of Sovnarkom and embezzling money, much like Panina.
91
 But 
there were two accusations here, one criminal and one political. Rather than the multitude of 
crimes convincing observers of the guilt of the accused, as the regime expected, it left them 
confused as to what exactly was being judged, particularly as prosecutors often skirted 
around the stated accusations, as in Purishkevich’s case. This, of course, reflected the 
Bolsheviks’ views of their enemies; namely, that mentalities and social background were as 
important as action in determining opposition to the new regime. But while many ordinary 
Russians shared these suspicions, their views were less clear-cut, and their interpretations of 
these trials were probably confused. 
 The second issue was the lack of control over the trials. The lengthy, aggressive 
speeches by the defendants were eminently predictable, as were angry, intimidating shouts 
from a hostile audience, which influenced the form of the public’s involvement in the trial. 
On 21 December, in the trial of a journalist accused of slander, judges demonstrated less 
tolerance of such practices. The journalist admitted the accusations, but rather than focus on 
them, he persisted, despite the warnings of the chair, in treating the tribunal as an opportunity 
to address the people about the injustices of the new regime and how its political repression 
compared to that employed under tsarism. The chair lost patience, stopped the speech, 
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removed the public from the hall and conducted the rest of the proceedings behind closed 
doors.
92
  
This step was not taken in Purishkevich’s trial, but it became common to hold trials 
behind closed doors, select a favourable audience and restrict the defendants’ speeches. At 
the very least, judges became adept at curtailing trials if they moved away from an acceptable 
script. In April 1918, when Martov’s attacks on the Bolsheviks prompted a mixed reaction 
from the audience, the trial was stopped. The public were removed and only readmitted after 
their tickets (and possibly allegiance) were rechecked by guards.
93
 Appointing professional 
lawyers also made trials more predictable. As noted, the regime had hoped that the public 
would act for the defence and the prosecution, but by late 1917, the regime had started 
appointing prosecutors and an institute of defence counsels was created in March 1918, 
followed by an institute for prosecutors in May.
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The final issue was the sentences; they were increasingly seen as too lenient. Many of 
those involved in the Junkers’ revolt were freed after signing a form declaring that they 
would not oppose the Bolsheviks and would reappear before the tribunal when required. Most 
fled.
95
 Panina refused to return the money, but supporters had raised the sum by 19 December 
and she was freed.
96
 Martov was found guilty of attacking the government to undermine its 
authority, but was only publicly censured and condemned for ‘thoughtless’ behaviour.97 On 
17 April 1918, in response to Purishkevich’s repeated requests to spend time with his sick 
son, he was visited by a deputation that included the Cheka’s head, Dzerzhinskii. 
Purishkevich promised not to participate in political life and he was released.
98
 The other 
defendants in the case also bombarded the authorities with petitions about illnesses, age 
(several were young) and other issues.
99
 These appeals were pre-empted by an amnesty that 
also freed Boldyrev after only serving a few months of his sentence. 
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The Petrograd authorities issued this wide-ranging amnesty on 1 May 1918 as part of 
the May Day celebrations. G. E. Zinov’ev, the leading Bolshevik in the city, declared that 
Soviet power was now sufficiently strong that individual opponents no longer constituted a 
threat, and workers and soldiers no longer wanted to treat them in the manner of the old 
regime.
100
 In reality, the regime may have been seeking support after months of furious 
debates over the peace treaty with Germany, the departure of the Left S.R.s from government 
and worsening economic conditions. Either way, the amnesty freed all those imprisoned with 
sentences of less than six months, those who had committed political crimes and those over 
seventy years old, while halving the sentences of more serious cases. It did not include bribe-
takers, traitors and speculators, and it had a few other caveats, but it did cover those who had 
committed these crimes before 1 May but were still awaiting sentence.
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The amnesty prompted criticism from the Commissariat of Justice, which suggested 
that ‘obvious counter-revolutionaries’ should not be included. The local justice official 
responded that the amnesty had only released around fifteen people, most of whom were 
reaching the end of their sentences.
102
 This was incorrect; the archives demonstrate that the 
amnesty was widely invoked. Whereas the loose definition of what constituted a political 
crime had helped to convict individuals involved in a wide range of activities, it now worked 
in their favour. Numerous prisoners appealed and were freed. The numbers were sufficient to 
produce a pre-printed release form with gaps for names to ease the process.
103
 The lawyer in 
Khomutov’s case (noted above) requested that his client be considered for the amnesty rather 
than bothering to contest the accusation of organizing a plot. The tribunal agreed that his case 
was ‘clearly political’ and freed him on 27 May.104 The amnesty was also utilized in cases of 
not recognizing Soviet power, not fulfilling orders, and distributing anti-Soviet propaganda. 
This amnesty was only applicable to the Petrograd region, but another operated in 
Moscow. This covered a range of crimes from sabotage and other anti-soviet activities, to 
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murder and bribery.
105
 Other local authorities also issued amnesties at various times. In 
Timskii district (Kursk province), for example, an amnesty was declared to celebrate the 
anniversary of the February Revolution. The Commissariat of Justice tried to prevent these, 
but struggled to exert control, even with the help of central directives.
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Generally, sentences rarely matched the harshness of the accusations, an impression 
reinforced by evidence from the provinces. Some provincial tribunals had rules on sentencing 
that were at odds with official decrees. Omsk had a harsher maximum sentence than was 
permitted, seven years forced labour, while in Iziumskii district (Kharkov province), the 
maximum was only a year in prison alongside the confiscation of any immovable property. 
Samarkand’s tribunal created an elaborate hierarchy of fines and prison sentences depending 
on the nature of the crime, as did Tver.
107
 Initially, though, most seem to have been more 
lenient than the tribunals in Moscow or Petrograd. By April 1918, for example, Stavropol’s 
tribunal had sentenced 177 people, but the harshest punishment was only three months in 
prison. In the Urals, the punishment was always community work.
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These incongruous sentences were attracting attention by early 1918 and those involved were 
forced to defend them. Galkin argued that the sentences demonstrated the ‘humanitarianism’ 
of the workers and the objectivity of tribunals, which rejected draconian bourgeois laws. He 
admitted later that tribunals dispensed ‘interesting’ and ‘lenient’ sentences, but argued that 
they reflected the psychology of the victors. The proletariat, unlike capitalists, did not desire 
revenge, merely to secure themselves against their enemies. It was only over time that they 
realized that severer penalties were needed to secure Soviet power.
109
 Looking back, 
Shteinberg also argued that the tribunals were ‘humane’, refusing to fall into the trap of ‘class 
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hatred’, while Zhukov believed that they helped to strengthen the achievements of the 
October Revolution.
110
 A. M. D’iakonov, chairman of the Moscow tribunal from late 1918, 
went further. He noted that tribunals operated in ‘difficult conditions’, but argued that they 
were ‘powerful organs’ of the ‘proletariat dictatorship’.111 
Sympathetic foreign observers agreed. Albert Rhys Williams, an American socialist 
and journalist for the New York Post, noted that the Bolsheviks’ answer to opposition was not 
the guillotine of the French Revolution, but the tribunal. In his second, longer memoir, he 
adopted almost identical words to Galkin; mildness was a conscious policy – the compassion 
of the masses towards their class enemies. This turned to ‘a deep harshness’ within years, but 
only as a reaction to the extensive opposition to the regime. He wondered whether the civil 
war would have been less bloody if initial sentences had been severer. For Louise Bryant, 
another American socialist and journalist, most countries would have killed an enemy such as 
Panina for the damage that she caused the regime. As it was, as her partner, John Reed, noted 
flippantly, Panina was ‘free to return to her palace!’112 
The trouble for the Bolsheviks was that the sentences were not seen as ‘humane’ by 
their opponents. The Kadets, for example, saw Panina’s trial as placing liberalism in the dock 
and the sentence was a triumph. The Bolsheviks had control over the tribunal, but feared the 
repercussions of imposing a stricter sentence.
113
 There was an obvious disparity between the 
severity of the allegations and the sentences, as opposition newspapers quickly pointed out. 
Vremia argued that if Purishkevich had organized a plot, then the sentence was lax and 
unprecedented in the history of jurisprudence. If, as the defendants claimed, the tribunal was 
a party court, then it was still merciful, as Purishkevich was a sharp critic of the Bolsheviks. 
Moreover, if the defendants were tried because they were political opponents, all other parties 
should also be arrested. In short, Vremia saw no logic behind the regime’s treatment of this 
case and felt that the sentences proved that the tribunal was solely a haphazard party tool.
114
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These disparities and unpredictable trials meant that cases rarely made effective 
publicity material. The Bolshevik newspaper, Pravda, covered tribunals sparsely with more 
on their objectives than results. The other official newspaper, Izvestiia, was more informative, 
but selective in order to draw the required lessons from a process that had rarely gone to plan. 
Its reporting on Panina’s trial, for example, was relatively balanced, although undue emphasis 
was given to the impact of the missing money on employees.
115
 Its coverage of 
Purishkevich’s trial, though, focused more on the prosecutors’ arguments, despite the fact 
that the defendants spoke for longer, and the same was true of subsequent trials.
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A further problem was highlighted in January 1918 when S. S. Zorin replaced Zhukov 
as chair of the Petrograd tribunal. On 29 January, Zorin complained to Sovnarkom. It was 
clear, he wrote, that the legal process was ‘completely disorganized’. Under his leadership, 
the investigative commission acted energetically, but faced an unnecessary problem. This 
was the Cheka, which was conducting its own investigations and dispensing its own ‘justice’. 
This led to overlap and wasted resources, while the confusion undermined the regime’s 
prestige. There was a lack of clarity over the respective responsibilities of the two bodies. He 
noted that the prisons were overflowing. This should mean that tribunals were overloaded 
with work, but they were only seeing cases passed from the Petrograd soviet. Most prisoners 
came from the Cheka. The tribunal had no idea who the Cheka arrested and what was done 
with prisoners, despite the fact that tribunals were supposed to have sole authority over the 
judicial process. Zorin asked Sovnarkom to clarify the responsibilities of the two organs, and 
to reassert that tribunals were the sole means of investigating and sentencing offenders for 
counter-revolutionary and other ‘political’ crimes.117 
On the surface, Sovnarkom agreed; the Cheka would search out, curtail and prevent 
crimes, while further investigations would be conducted by tribunals.
118
 In practice, nothing 
changed. By this stage, the Cheka was essentially autonomous, acting against opponents as it 
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saw fit, with no respect for legal processes. At the Sovnarkom meeting that established the 
Cheka on 7 December 1917, its head, Dzerzhinskii, proclaimed that he did not ‘seek forms of 
revolutionary justice; we are not in need of justice. It is war now – face to face, a fight to the 
finish’.119 These words encapsulated the Cheka’s mentality and, generally, Sovnarkom 
encouraged it. On 14 January 1918, Lenin demanded extra-judicial executions to deal with 
speculators and bandits causing food shortages. On 21 February, despite Left S.R. protests, 
Sovnarkom issued a decree, The Socialist Fatherland is in Danger, urging that all 
speculators, spies, hooligans and counter-revolutionaries should be shot on the spot.
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Encouraged, the Cheka then issued similar instructions.
121
 Essentially, Sovnarkom was 
demonstrating a growing commitment to ‘revolutionary terror’. 
This was reiterated in Lenin’s writings on law.122 In the draft of The Immediate Tasks 
of the Soviet Government written in late March 1918, Lenin assigned an important role to 
courts. They would cement the principle of involving the working and exploited classes in 
state administration, while targeting exploiters trying to regain power and, more importantly, 
ensure the strict discipline and self-discipline of the working people. Coercion, he believed, 
was essential in the transition to socialism, and the courts should be the organ that carried out 
that coercion, educating people in labour discipline and so on. So far, however, hardly 
anything had been achieved. In the final version in late April, Lenin was clear: the lack of 
progress was due to insufficient ruthlessness. The degree of coercion needed depended on the 
development of the revolutionary class, the legacy of war and the extent of the opposition; as 
government moves from military repression during civil war to administration, coercion 
shifts from on-the-spot shootings to trial by court. Currently, the need for military repression 
was too strong and the courts were too weak.
123
 All opposition needed to be dealt with more 
ruthlessly; party members taking bribes, workers involved in strikes and political opponents 
engaged in armed struggle were all enemies of the majority of the working classes. 
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This concern for ruthlessness led Lenin to intervene in the operation of tribunals. On 
15 March, one tribunal worker questioned the value of the press tribunal, feeling that it might 
even be harmful. Each trial saw well-prepared defendants with numerous witnesses and a 
hostile audience. Separating published criticism from other ‘counter-revolutionary’ crimes 
implied that this crime was less serious and that the Bolsheviks were simply clamping down 
on free speech. Officials in Petrograd and Moscow agreed and acted to abolish the tribunal 
and transfer all cases to ordinary tribunals.
124
 Lenin, though, wanted a full assessment of the 
press tribunal’s value before abolition, while hinting at further change. He argued that there 
was too much focus on ‘petty reform’ and not enough effort devoted to creating a ‘truly 
revolutionary court that is rapid and mercilessly severe’ with its enemies.125 
Furthermore, on 2 May 1918, the Moscow tribunal sentenced four judges charged 
with blackmail and accepting bribes to six months in prison. Lenin was livid: ‘to award bribe-
takers such derisively weak and mild sentences instead of shooting is disgraceful behaviour 
for a Communist and a revolutionary’. He believed that they must be expelled from the party 
and condemned publicly. Sovnarkom also attacked the ‘exceptional leniency’ of the sentence 
and instructed the Commissariat of Justice to create minimum sentences for those involved in 
bribery. A retrial saw the terms increased to ten years, and Lenin proposed that ten years in 
prison and ten years forced labour was the minimum sentence for bribe-takers.
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The leadership’s dissatisfaction with the performance of tribunals led to several major 
reforms. First, on 4 May, tribunals were restricted to provincial capitals, large industrial 
centres (over 200,000 inhabitants) and major railway junctions. All other local tribunals were 
abolished, as was the press tribunal. Mundane crimes were transferred to people’s courts, but 
tribunals were instructed to pay more attention to pogroms, hooliganism, espionage, forgery 
and bribery.
127
 These changes were supposed to combat the existence of too many tribunals 
focusing on too many crimes, exacerbating their ineffectiveness. At the first congress of 
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provincial commissars of justice on 21–25 April 1918, local reports had made it clear that 
many tribunals also dealt with civil and criminal cases, either because of a lack of counter-
revolutionary cases, the absence of people’s courts, or inexperienced personnel.128 In some 
places, this was taking up significant amounts of time; before March 1918, for instance, 
nearly twenty-two per cent of the crimes investigated by Ufa’s tribunal concerned illicit 
brewing.
129
 Yet, it has been noted that tribunals continued to exist at district level after May 
and new ones were even created.
130
 Similarly, concerns over the investigation of civil and 
criminal cases were still being raised at the end of the year.
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 Many rural areas continued to 
lack people’s courts to judge ‘ordinary’ crimes and local officials remained, understandably, 
confused as to what constituted a ‘counter-revolutionary’ crime. 
Second, on 29 May, a supreme tribunal for serious cases from across Russia was 
established under the central executive committee of the Congress of Soviets in Moscow.
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This would be a focal point to unite all tribunals, while providing a model to follow in terms 
of procedure and sentencing. According to Kurskii’s speech to the committee on 29 May, 
some cases had a broad significance for the state and were too serious for local tribunals to 
judge. He admitted that some local tribunals had not always reached the highest standards; 
there needed to be a stronger defence of the revolution’s achievements.133 In Izvestiia on the 
same day, Stuchka agreed; tribunals should aid the ‘political struggle’ and this new tribunal 
would strengthen the regime’s response to counter-revolution.134 
On 11 June, an appellation department was created under the central executive 
committee. It processed complaints made against all tribunals (apart from the supreme 
tribunal) and could revoke the sentence or order a retrial.
135
 This removed further authority 
over tribunals away from the Commissariat of Justice, particularly if, as some have 
speculated, this department was designed as much to assert greater control over the sentences 
imposed by local tribunals as to alleviate concerns over miscarriages of justice. This 
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interpretation is reinforced by the fact that on 16 June the regime permitted tribunals to 
impose the death penalty, thereby dramatically increasing their powers.
136
 
The supreme tribunal stated its intent in its first case. Captain A. M. Shchastnyi, 
commander of the Baltic Fleet, was arrested on 27 May 1918 after growing conflict with the 
commissar of war, L. D. Trotskii, over how to respond to the German threat.
137
 Shchastnyi’s 
desire to preserve the Baltic Fleet and defend Petrograd, while supported locally, clashed 
with the government. His independence and social background (as a former noble officer) 
fuelled Trotskii’s suspicions, and he was accused of exploiting Russia’s perilous foreign and 
political situation to launch a counter-revolutionary plot.
138
  
Shchastnyi’s trial on 20–21 June was held in an ordinary room in the Kremlin; 
covered in spit, with dirt and torn papers everywhere.
139
 The impression is that this trial was 
intended to be business-like and practical, rather than the symbolic and public trials of 
previous months. Shchastnyi was permitted one lawyer, who was only given access to the 
evidence half an hour before the trial. The investigation was incomplete and the evidence 
contradictory. The only available witness was Trotskii and his lengthy testimony condemned 
Shchastnyi for fostering discontent among sailors with a view to organizing a revolt against 
the regime. Ultimately, Trotskii argued that Shchastnyi had political ambitions and hoped to 
become the dictator of the Baltic Fleet and, perhaps, assume a national role.
140
 Shchastnyi’s 
lawyer rebutted Trotskii’s charges one-by-one and Shchastnyi proclaimed his own innocence, 
but to no avail. The trial was designed to deliver a guilty verdict and send out a clear message 
to other former tsarist officers in the Red Army. Shchastnyi was duly convicted. To the 
surprise of the audience and the relief of the chief prosecutor, Krylenko, it pronounced the 
death penalty. Appeals were rejected and Shchastnyi was executed the following day. 
This sentence was seen as significant. Abroad, newspapers noted that while the Cheka 
had shot plenty of people, this was the first death sentence issued by a tribunal.
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 At home, 
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the Bolshevik press moved on to the defensive. Izvestiia emphasized the accusations by 
assigning most space to Trotskii’s and Krylenko’s speeches. The defence was dealt with 
quickly before the reports finished with a long reiteration of the accusations in the form of the 
sentence.
142
 More unusual, however, was the lengthy defence of the death penalty offered by 
Krylenko in an interview. He argued that the main goals of tribunals had not been reached 
before this case because of the interference of Left S.R.s and jurists. The struggle against 
counter-revolution must be reflected in the tribunal’s decisions as well as its investigations. 
The only measure that could protect the revolution was the death penalty and it was justified 
legally.
143
 The sentence was not desirable, then, but necessary and logical. The tribunal was 
only doing its duty. 
The impact of this sentence was reinforced by the supreme tribunal’s next case, which 
investigated fifteen ‘provocateurs’ who had informed on the revolutionary movement to the 
Okhrana before 1917. Eight were sentenced to death and shot immediately. According to a 
former defence lawyer, the death sentence now became almost the only sentence passed by 
the supreme tribunal.
144
 This was not strictly true and the evidence does not support this 
claim across all tribunals. In a survey of thirty-two tribunals in Russia in 1918, seventy-three 
per cent of 4,483 cases examined resulted in convictions. A total of thirty-seven per cent of 
sentences involved a prison term and forced labour; thirty-three per cent a fine; and only 0.3 
per cent (fourteen) pronounced the death penalty. Executions rose to fourteen per cent of 
sentences in the first half of 1919, but dropped back to eleven per cent in the first half of 1920 
and seven per cent in the second half. By then, seventy-four per cent of sentences resulted in 
a prison term and forty-six per cent of these in 1919–20 were for less than a year (sometimes 
only a few days).
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These figures mask a great deal of regional variation. A similar survey produced by 
the Commissariat of Justice in 1922 noted that an average of one per cent of all sentences in 
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the first half of 1922 across Russia pronounced the death penalty. Tribunals in Briansk, 
Olonets, Tver, Iaroslavl and some other towns had not sentenced anyone to death, while in 
Moscow, Saratov and Tsaritsyn, the figure was ten per cent or more.
146
 Earlier, in Samara, 
235 of 518 accused (forty-five per cent) were executed in the first half of 1919, while 116 of 
456 (twenty-five per cent) sentenced in Azerbaijan between May 1920 and April 1921 were 
shot.
147
 Tribunals attached to military units and the railways were also harsher.
148
 Variations 
in local tensions must have mattered. Equally, as tribunals answered to several masters, the 
balance of power in an area between justice officials, soviets and the Cheka was also 
probably important in determining the relative ferocity of a tribunal. 
A study of Saratov province, however, suggests that while tribunals were arbitrary 
forms of justice, local tribunals varied between ruthlessness and amnesties in much the same 
way as their counterparts in Petrograd and Moscow. The Cheka, invariably, was far worse.
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Tribunals in Viatka province are described in a similar manner. Just over five per cent of 
sentences in 1919 resulted in the death penalty. Most offences were ‘crimes of office’, 
followed by counter-revolutionary activities. The sheer number of new officials led to many 
seeking to profit from their new position. Otherwise, crimes ranged from sabotage, 
speculation and espionage, to bribery and forgery, matching those outlined in the decree on 4 
May.
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Nevertheless, as a whole, despite the changes, tribunals were still not as ruthless as 
many Bolsheviks desired. It is unlikely, for example, that Lenin would have been happy with 
the Moscow tribunal in early July 1918. The trial of a former chair of the tribunal, who 
concealed his criminal past, resulted in public censure and a ban from holding public office 
for a year. A few days later, another official linked to the tribunal was found guilty of 
speculation, but was only banned from holding an elective public office for five years.
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These sentences were a far cry from those advocated by Lenin and further reforms to 
tribunals over the following months did not change this picture significantly. 
 
 
 
The problems faced by tribunals passed the initiative to the Cheka and contributed to the 
escalation of terror. The Cheka spread across frontier zones, post and telegraph stations, 
railway junctions, and into local districts by summer 1918. In doing so, it started to dominate 
tribunals. Increasingly, the Cheka decided whether a tribunal would become involved in a 
case; that is, whether it would transfer cases to the tribunal or whether it would deal with 
them alone. In some cases, the Cheka not only carried out the investigation, but instructed the 
tribunal on the desired verdict. The tribunal simply had to rubber stamp the decision.
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Moreover, some prominent tribunal workers became associated with the Cheka, including 
D’iakonov, Galkin and Zhukov, which helped to blur distinctions between the two bodies.153 
Officially, terror arrived in autumn 1918. An attempt on Lenin’s life and the murder 
of the head of the Petrograd Cheka, M. S. Uritskii, prompted a decree on 5 September that 
directed the Cheka to shoot opponents summarily, initiating what became known as the ‘Red 
Terror’.154 This decree may have sanctioned what was already occurring, but under state 
sponsorship terror reached new levels over the following months. A recent study stated that 
the Cheka shot 5,381 people in 1918.
155
 The real figure was probably higher and increased 
over subsequent years. The Cheka provided the regime with a quicker alternative to tribunals 
when it came with dealing with enemies. Consequently, it headed the regime’s attack on its 
enemies by summer 1918 and was the driving force of the terror. 
 Nevertheless, many of those involved in tribunals did protest against the Cheka’s 
actions and defended the need for revolutionary justice rather than revolutionary terror. 
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Initially, the fight was led by the Left S.R.s through the Commissariat of Justice. One of the 
Cheka’s first acts was to arrest several prominent socialists agitating in favour of the newly-
elected Constituent Assembly (which saw the Bolsheviks in a minority) on 16 December 
1917. Horrified, the Left S.R. commissar of justice, Shteinberg, promptly freed them on his 
own authority. Dzerzhinskii complained to Sovnarkom and its discussion on 19 December 
reprimanded Shteinberg and confirmed that the Cheka’s orders could only be revised by 
Sovnarkom.
156
 Shteinberg pursued the struggle. The following weeks saw debates confirming 
the commissariat’s authority over tribunals and the tribunals’ right to sentence cases, 
complaints about an incomplete legal system, and demands to transfer ill prisoners to 
hospitals. The Left S.R.s also succeeded in gaining representation in the Cheka’s leadership 
in an attempt to moderate it from within.
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In his memoirs, Shteinberg argued that the new regime was strong enough to apply 
justice, albeit of a revolutionary nature, through tribunals and courts. There was no need to 
apply summary methods. The regime should focus on individuals who conducted specific 
crimes, rather than on potential crimes. Suppression of the liberal Kadet party, for example, 
was wrong; instead, individual Kadets who committed crimes should be tried. Terror, he 
claimed, was one mistake of the French Revolution that Russia could avoid.
158
 It was not that 
the Left S.R.s were opposed to violence; rather, they objected to it becoming institutionalized 
through an acceptance of the arbitrary methods of the Cheka. 
 Shteinberg was fighting a losing battle. Important Bolsheviks, particularly Lenin and 
Trotskii, were more ruthless, while Sovnarkom tended to favour the Cheka in these disputes. 
The Cheka, Shteinberg complained, saw itself as a commissariat and rejected attempts to 
control any element of its activities, taking all disputes to Sovnarkom. Here, Left S.R.s were 
in a minority and had to wait for ‘favourable’ moments to press their case to have any chance 
of victory, moments when the Bolsheviks needed their support on other issues.
159
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Lenin and others became tired of Shteinberg’s constant complaints and demands for 
‘legality’. They felt that there were more important issues and they shared Dzerzhinskii’s 
view that violence was a necessary weapon and that no quarter should be given in the battle 
against the regime’s enemies. Galkin argued that Left S.R.s did little practical work in 
tribunals, instead bombarding them with demands to maintain formalities in arrests and 
paperwork. Forms, he believed, were unimportant when risking one’s life against enemies.160 
Lenin, meanwhile, admitted in a speech to Cheka staff on 7 November 1918 that there had 
been many mistakes, but this was inevitable and these were individual mistakes. The bigger 
picture was of a drastic struggle against the bourgeoisie; the harder the Bolsheviks pressed, 
the more the bourgeoisie resisted. The Cheka was vital in suppressing the opposition, which 
was the only way to emancipate the proletariat.
161
 Ultimately, Shteinberg wrote that Lenin 
supported terror over ‘justice’, believing it was impossible to make a revolution without 
executions. The Left S.R.s resigned from Sovnarkom in early March 1918 in opposition to 
the peace treaty with Germany. With the Cheka’s activities sanctioned and the departure of 
the Left S.R.s, Shteinberg argued that, in practice, the Red Terror had started in spring 
1918.
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 Opposition to the regime’s growing preference for arbitrary justice continued, finding 
a vocal forum, if an ineffective one, in the executive committee of the Congress of Soviets. 
Several debates are worth noting. First, the committee saw a turbulent discussion after 
Martov’s trial. Martov was found guilty of attempting to undermine the authority of the 
government, but the tribunal did not end up ruling on the original libel accusation by Stalin, 
something that he and his supporters sought to rectify. On 25 April, nine days after the trial, 
Krylenko argued in the committee that Martov’s case had violated procedural rules. The 
tribunal had conflated two accusations (against Stalin and the state) and should have ruled on 
the accusations against Stalin. Krylenko requested that the sentence be annulled and the case 
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retried. The Bolshevik chair, Ia. M. Sverdlov, refused to allow Martov and others to speak; 
this was a resolution and merely needed voting on. Despite Martov’s protests, the Bolshevik 
majority passed the resolution. The minutes gloss over what was clearly a period of turmoil. 
Officially, Sverdlov expelled Martov for protesting.
163
 Unofficially, the Mensheviks walked 
out in support, while Latvian riflemen were needed to restore order.
164
 The case, however, 
was never retried. The Mensheviks claimed that this reflected an awareness among some 
senior Bolsheviks, many of whom were absent from the meeting, that this case was bad 
publicity, and that the resolution was only passed after pressure from Stalin’s supporters.165 
 The second debate worth noting came in response to Kurskii’s announcement on 29 
May of a new tribunal under the committee. The first speaker, an S.R., argued that the decree 
should be rejected. The nature of tribunals had changed, reducing the role of the people, and 
he believed that this role should be reinstated; it was a major achievement of the revolution. 
Martov made a similar argument, accusing the regime of not trusting workers. Their lack of 
involvement meant that tribunals no longer served the proletariat’s interests, undermining 
their ability to enforce legality. Another speaker believed that the new tribunal was an 
attempt to remove more powers from local soviets. The Bolsheviks were able to utilize their 
majority to pass the new decree.
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The committee’s reaction on 11 June to the creation of an appellation department saw 
two further points raised. First, enhancing the committee’s role in the legal process would not 
improve matters as the Bolsheviks dominated the committee and Sovnarkom remained the 
main decision-making body. Second, the numerous decrees concerning legal innovations had 
no point if they were all bypassed by another, independent institution (the Cheka).
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 The final significant debate was over the execution of Shchastnyi. When the Left 
S.R.s failed to have his sentence quashed in a rushed meeting of the committee, they 
withdrew their representatives from the supreme tribunal.
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 A furious attack on the trial and 
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the death penalty was launched in the press by the socialist opposition to the Bolsheviks. 
Martov argued that Trotskii acted as a prosecutor in Shchastnyi’s trial, not a witness, and that 
the tribunal was ‘a joke of a court’.169 For socialists, the death penalty, above all else, 
emphasized the return of the institutional violence of the tsarist regime and the loss of one of 
the great achievements of the revolution. Yet, these socialists were fighting a losing battle. 
Soon after this, the Left S.R.s were involved in several revolts against the Bolsheviks and 
found themselves in front of a tribunal in November 1917. Suppression of the Mensheviks 
was slower, but equally effective in the long run. 
Nevertheless, complaints about the Cheka and the drift towards terror continued from 
a different source: namely, Bolsheviks involved in the Commissariat of Justice. Krylenko, for 
example, was a ruthless prosecutor for the tribunals, but also a vocal opponent of the Cheka. 
Unusually, the Cheka had been created by a government resolution rather than a formal 
decree, and Krylenko and other legal theorists were quick to highlight this, questioning the 
Cheka’s legality and authority.170 Even in later writings, these theorists were damning in their 
assessment of the Cheka’s authority.171 
The second national congress of local justice officials in Moscow on 2–6 July 1918 
condemned the Cheka. One speaker noted that its activities mirrored those of tribunals, but 
while the latter were elected, the former was unaccountable. Both also had incompatible laws. 
The Cheka, for instance, left prisoners languishing in jails indefinitely, while tribunals were 
committed to bringing charges within forty-eight hours. It was not that the Cheka should not 
exist, but that its activities should be curtailed and controlled. As long as the Cheka retained 
its current form, another speaker argued, justice would always take second place. The 
congress resolved that the Cheka should be placed under the control of local soviets.
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Officials at all levels in the Commissariat of Justice remained committed to maintaining, as 
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they saw it, a degree of legality; that is, allegiance to a reformed legal system, and some level 
of order and procedure when investigating crimes and sentencing offenders. 
The first congress of the chairmen of tribunals on 29 October–3 November 1918 also 
asked the government to curtail the Cheka’s powers. Participants were not against violence, 
declaring that the working classes needed to inflict severe blows on their enemies. But, like 
Zorin at the beginning of the year, their resolution painted a picture of confusion and conflict 
between tribunals and the Cheka. Tribunals were arresting people, only for the Cheka to 
release them, or vice versa, while the Cheka transferred people between prisons without 
informing tribunals. The Cheka also passed incomplete files to tribunals with missing 
documents and unsigned testimonies from the accused. The congress demanded primacy for 
tribunals in investigating and sentencing criminals.
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In part, the argument was also about power; justice officials and tribunal workers 
resented the Cheka undermining their right to judge crimes and that the Cheka was only 
accountable to Sovnarkom. This resentment was shared by other Bolsheviks. The Cheka was 
subjected to several attacks in the party newspaper, Pravda. On 21 November 1918, Pravda 
criticized tribunals as slow and poorly organized, but noted that they were weakened by the 
Cheka’s arbitrary actions. The paper outlined the above resolution of tribunal chairmen and 
reiterated the call to curtail the Cheka’s activities.174 Like other critics, it did not oppose the 
Cheka’s existence, but its abuses of its powers. 
Sovnarkom was forced to act after an article was published in the Cheka’s weekly 
newspaper in September 1918 advocating the use of torture. Sovnarkom condemned the 
article on 25 October, closed the paper and created a commission to investigate the Cheka, 
albeit without weakening its fight against the enemy.
175
 Local soviets joined the chorus of 
disapproval, also complaining about their lack of control. They had been ordered to establish 
and fund local branches of the Cheka, but had no control over its activities. They disliked 
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having a powerful and autonomous body operating in their locality. Moreover, they argued 
that many Cheka officials were corrupt and inefficient, and that arbitrary violence was 
counter-productive. A survey in October 1918 saw around eighty-five per cent of those polled 
(nearly 150 soviets) demand that local soviets be given greater control over the Cheka.
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These protests reflected wider suspicions of the regime’s growing authoritarianism and 
centralization of power, which marginalized local activists and the soviet structure 
established in 1917. 
The attempts to curtail the Cheka proved futile. The commission established on 25 
October produced no public results and Krylenko later suggested that the commission was 
not serious about curbing the Cheka’s activities.177 The Cheka was later told to release all 
prisoners who could not be charged within two weeks, as well as end its practice of taking 
hostages to discourage plots. District branches, which tended to conduct the worst violence, 
were closed. Decrees on 17 February and 3 April 1919 restated that tribunals had the right to 
sentence all cases and to observe other areas of the Cheka’s activities.178 Yet, this was 
undermined on 21 October 1919 when the Cheka was permitted to sentence economic 
offences (profiteering, bribery, forgery and misappropriation) committed by state personnel 
in its own tribunal. This lasted until March 1920 and operated as a punitive organ rather than 
a judicial one.
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 Unsurprisingly, then, when the second congress of the chairmen of tribunals 
convened on 26–28 April 1920, it was dominated by the same complaints about the Cheka 
that were made in 1918.
180
 
At the same time, there is no sense that the sentences dispensed by tribunals became 
any harsher. Indeed, further amnesties followed. On 6 November 1918, the first nationwide 
amnesty was suggested by Sovnarkom and sanctioned by the Sixth All-Russian Exceptional 
Congress of Soviets. It freed all those involved in plots, preparing plots or in oppositional 
groups if their guilt had not been proven within two weeks. It also freed all hostages, except 
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those held in response to hostages taken by the Bolsheviks’ enemies.181 This decree was 
probably designed to mitigate the adverse publicity provoked by the onset of state-sanctioned 
terror in early September, but it was not as generous as the May amnesty. It is also likely that 
most had their guilt proven within the deadline, while, in practice, terror continued. 
Nonetheless, similar amnesties were held to commemorate May Day and the anniversary of 
the October Revolution in 1919 and 1920.
182
 If the May 1918 amnesty was representative, 
these could have benefited significant numbers of people. 
Nevertheless, tribunals lasted throughout the civil war years and the Bolsheviks 
continued to place some value on them. In most cases, they became little more than a closed 
court that passed arbitrary judgement on the accused. But some public trials remained. In 
certain cases – for example, judging the Left S.R.s in November 1918 – a tribunal helped 
portray a quasi-legal image that may have convinced Russians that some level of ‘justice’ 
continued to operate, while still conveying an educational message. On 20 October 1921, 
Lenin ordered Moscow’s tribunal to investigate a senior official for inaction. The trial should 
be ‘educational’, indicating that this behaviour was unacceptable, while the sentence was to 
be ‘sufficiently impressive’ to act as a deterrent.183 
However, the role of tribunals had changed over the course of 1918. They entered the 
year with a modicum of independence, with unpredictable trials and sentences, providing a 
forum where prosecutors and defenders could debate the nature of ‘revolutionary justice’. By 
the end of the year, there was greater control over their activities and they played second 
fiddle to the Cheka. Their role was an optional one. In some cases, it suited the regime to use 
a tribunal, perhaps even a public trial, but it was no longer considered as essential or desirable 
as it had been at the beginning of the year. 
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Revolutionary tribunals were abolished on 31 October 1922 with the creation of the Soviet 
Union. Their cases were transferred to new supreme courts in the various republics. Tribunals 
continued in the military, while the techniques developed in their investigations and trials 
persisted into the nineteen-twenties and beyond. Otherwise, their legacy was mixed. They did 
provide a forum for the Bolsheviks to display their vision of a new society. The early trials 
saw the state quickly assert its right to examine and control behaviour in many areas of 
everyday life. Tribunals first dealt with open opposition or other political groups, but they 
soon expanded to cover non-recognition of Soviet power, inefficient work, illegal trading and 
other such crimes. Any activity not sanctioned by the state became an activity that harmed the 
state and, hence, a counter-revolutionary or political crime. Tribunals conveyed the message 
that people were not to be judged solely on actions, or by established legal procedure, but on 
all issues (from mentality to social background) that could affect an individual’s relationship 
with the state. They emphasized that the state was reasserting its right to control Russia’s 
political landscape after the freedoms enjoyed during 1917. All of these elements were 
central to the Soviet Union throughout its existence. 
The idealism surrounding law that greeted the October Revolution, like so many other 
areas, fell victim to the necessities of maintaining power during a brutal civil war. Although 
Bolshevik legal experts continued to debate the role and nature of law under a socialist 
regime, the opportunity to redevelop law and jurisprudence in a socialist form was lost. Law 
was fated to be nothing more than an instrument for repression and social control, firmly 
controlled by the state. Bolshevik leaders became disillusioned with the value of the law as a 
means of combating their enemies, in large part due to the unpredictable nature of tribunals. 
Tribunals did become more organized and predictable in the second half of 1918, but by this 
stage the regime was favouring terror as a solution. 
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Ultimately, revolutionary tribunals failed to inspire the level of fear that the leadership 
expected or to deal with the regime’s enemies sufficiently severely. The Bolsheviks had the 
French Revolution in mind when they had created them, but Russian tribunals, although far 
from mild, did not follow in the brutal footsteps of their predecessors. It has been argued that 
the chaotic operation of the early tribunals and their unpredictable sentences contributed to 
the growth of terror, as did the tribunals’ balancing act between several different masters – 
the Commissariat of Justice, local soviets and the Cheka.
184
 Certainly, there is an element of 
truth in this argument. But tribunals never deliberately led the terror as their counterparts had 
done in France. This may have been due to the existence of an alternative, the Cheka. From 
the start, this body promised a quicker solution to the problem of opposition, a solution which 
became attractive as the civil war intensified. The relative weakness of tribunals undermined 
support for the idea of revolutionary justice, encouraging a move towards revolutionary 
terror. Terror, of course, was another element that underpinned the Soviet Union throughout 
its existence. 
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